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human action and agency 
Scientific explanation is generally understood 
to be causal explanation, such that all causes 
are thought to have effects and all effects are 
thought to have causes. This creates a funda-
mental problem for any discussion of human 
action and agency, where these are understood 
in terms of a human capacity to initiate new 
causal chains. Specifically, on the one hand we 
suppose that human agency has causal proper-
ties in that human action has effects on the 
world; yet on the other hand, we also suppose 
that the capacity to initiate new causal chains 
cannot itself be the effect of prior causes. That 
is, we tend to treat human action and agency as 
part of the world's causal order when we 
consider the effects of our actions, but then 
turn around to deny that human action and 
agency are part of the causal order when we 
speak of our capacity as agents to act freely. 
Thus the problem of agency is to explain how 
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human action is both part of the causal d 
and simultaneously independent of that o~ er 
Philosophers regard this as the probleor er. 
freedom and determinism (for example ;: of 
1986: ch. 7). ' agel 
Neoclassical approaches 
Neoclassical economics approaches the p 
. ro-
blem of agency and actIOn from a methodol 
gical individualist perspective, or from the id: 
that all action arises out of the choices of 
mdlvlduals. Accordmgly, explaining human 
action is a matter of explaining individual 
choice, where this in turn, as Elster (1989) puts 
it, is a matter of explaining Lndividuals' desires 
(or preferences) and opportunities (or con-
straints). For example, consumer behavior is 
understood in terms of what people want, 
given their resources. Two approaches may be 
distinguished. Some neoclassical economists, 
following Stigler and Becker (1977), argue that 
all people have essentially the same preferences 
and desires, so that choice and human action 
reduces to differences in opportunities. In this 
instance, choice may be said to be determined 
by the constraints and opportunities an in-
dividual has. Individual action is then explain-
able as an effect of those factors that cause the 
individual to have a particular opportunity set. 
However, this means that agency, understood 
as the capacity to initiate new causal chains 
and act freely, is not explained. 
Other neoclassical economists allow that 
individuals' desires and preferences differ, but 
this does not make it possible to explain how 
choice may freely originate. On the standard 
view, the formal , axiomatic representation of 
individual objective functions fully explains the 
content and structure of individual desires and 
the preferences they generate. Thus, for any 
given set of opportunities, there is always a 
determinate response on the part of the 
individual, explainable in terms of that indivi-
dual's desire/preference structure. That is, an 
individual's desires cause the "choice" an 
individual makes. In comparison to the 
Stigler- Becker view, where opportunities dic-
tate choice, on this view desires and prefer-
given an opportunity set, dictate choice. eOces, . . both views, however, chOIce IS caused by 
00 I d . ething else - name y, eSlres or opportu-
som s _ and individuals only fail to behave as 
mue d··f h ,,". I " the theory pre letS I t ey ~re l:ratlOna. 
rhus while, on the neoclassical View, social 
·ence explanation conforms to the standard 
SCI d I . d ·d use-and-effect mo e, It oes not proVI e an 
ca . d 
ccount of human action an agency. 
a Of course, the classic philosophical problem 
of freedom and determinism will not be solved 
in the work of social sCientists; but, given the 
belief that human agency IS a real dimensIOn of 
economic life (equally presupposed by neoclas-
sical and heterodox economists), adequate 
social science requires analysis that allows for 
the possibility of free action in human affairs. 
Heterodox economists thus strive to explain 
the economy in terms that account for how 
action can be relatively independent of causal 
frameworks in which it occurs. Two principal 
approaches can be distinguished. 
A post-Keynesian non-ergodic world 
post-Keynesianism, especially as it emphasizes 
Keynes on true uncertainty, rejects the neo-
classical assumption that the world is ergodic. 
To say that the wo~ld is ergodic is to say that its 
laws or basic causal relationships are unchan-
ging. Thus, neoclassical economists focus on 
risk rather than uncertainty because, unlike 
post-Keynesians, they suppose that the prob-
ability distributions of future events are settled 
and knowable. Post-Keynesians hold that an 
economy's causal relationships may change, 
that consequently the probability distributions 
of future events are generally not knowable, 
and that uncertainty, not risk, needs to be 
incorporated into expectation formation. 
Moreover, the reason that post-Keynesians 
hold these propositions is that they believe 
economic reality is transmutable, that is, that it 
may be transformed by human action (David-
son 1996). 
This understanding clearly does provide an 
account of agency lacking in neoclassicism. On 
the neoclassical view, individuals' actions are 
fully explainable in terms of prior causes. 
human action and agency 
Empirical research aims at uncovering the 
arguments (preferences) in utility functions, 
on the assumption that these same arguments 
will dictate like future behavior in a world 
disturbed only by "exogenous shocks." On the 
post-Keynesian view, knowing individuals' past 
choices is only a partial guide to future 
behavior, and individuals need to be under-
stood as agents that have the power to initiate 
new causal chains of events. 
There are two rationales behind the post-
Keynesian view. First, in a transmutable world 
- one that is historical and path-dependent -
change in the objects of choice is necessarily 
associated with change in preferences. One 
cannot prefer A to B in a world in which A and 
B no longer exist, but A' and 13' do. What 
explains the capacity of individuals to form 
new preferences? Though an answer to this 
question falls beyond the scope of political 
economy, it may nonetheless be said that the 
element of indeterminacy this capacity intro-
duces is fully compatible with saying that 
individuals act as free agents. Second, in a 
transmutable world, human action changes the 
future. This implies that past events fail to 
dictate future events when human agency 
intervenes. Thus, seeing the world as non-
ergodic is a direct demonstration of a capacity 
for free action. 
Marxian and feminist views on agency 
Marxism provides another type of approach to 
explaining human action and agency. Classical 
Marxism is associated with base-
superstructure explanations in which it is 
argued that developments in a society's eco-
nomic base, understood in terms of the forces 
and relations of production, ramify through to 
changes in its superstructure, understood in 
terms of that society's politics, culture and 
property relations. Thus development in the 
former, broadly speaking, causes developments 
in the latter, though with lags and reverse 
repercussions. This analysis has led some 
commentators to argue mistakenly that Marx-
ist views of history are deterministic in the 
sense that an inescapable logic dictates the 
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course of events. A more accurate conception 
involves saying that broad patterns of historical 
development, especially as reflecting the evolu-
tion of the modes of production and social 
formations, account for the general pattern of 
events. Where does human agency, then, come 
into this picture? 
Marx's class analysis characterized the 
proletariat as the universal class in the sense 
of being that class with no attachment to either 
capitalism or class society per se. In his view, 
this unique status enabled working people to 
understand the nature of EXPLOITATION, social 
forces, and generally the factors that caused 
them to act as wage laborers. However, this 
understanding also had a revolutionizing effect 
in that it gave them a further capacity to step 
outside of the causal framework of their lives. 
Revolutionary action, then, was free action for 
Marx, and the working class was a genuine 
agent of historical change. Though history 
might move in broad patterns, how it was 
played out at particular points of time and in 
specific arenas was due to free activity tied 
specifically to consciousness of that history. 
For Marx, of course, classes, and indivi-
duals, to the extent that they act with class 
consciousness, are society's agents. However, 
Marx's general model of agency has been 
adopted by other heterodox thinkers for 
different types of agents. Feminists, for exam-
ple, also hold that gaining an understanding of 
the causal frameworks in which individuals 
generally operate creates a capacity to act freely 
and overcome those frameworks, when they 
argue that women who develop an under-
standing of patriarchal society may transcend 
patriarchal relationships, and help others to do 
so as welL We might thus emphasize Marx's 
general approach as a dialectical one in 
assuming that a causal process may itself bring 
forth breaks in a causal order, here due 
specifically to the emergence of human agency. 
Conclusion 
Heterodox economists, therefore, place impor-
tant emphasis on having accounts of human 
action, and yet also work with different 
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strategies for explaining .agency. Ironical1y, 
neoclaSSical econorrucs, which begins with ~ 
methodological individualist postulate that all 
actions derives from individuals, lacks a cl 
means of arguing that individuals are in~ 
agents in the sense of initiating causal 
quences. This would seem to be an impon:: 
deficiency, since explaining the world in caUSe-
and-effect terms ought not exclude that set of 
(initiating) causes due to human action and 
agency. 
See also: 
Austrian school of political economy; dialec-
tical method; feminist poli~cal economy: major 
contemporary themes; holistic method; indivi. 
dual and society; institutions and habits. 
Marxist political economy: . contemporar; 
vanetles; methodological mdlVldualism and 
collectivism; neoclassical economics; post-Key. 
nesian political economy: major contemporary 
themes 
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JOHN B. DAVIS 
human capital 
Origins and history 
Human capital refers to the broad range of 
knowledge and skills possessed by individuals, 
making it possible for them to produce goods 
and services. As with physical capital, human 
